Protection Against Slavery in New Zealand by Heesterman, Katja
  
 
KATJA HEESTERMAN 
 
Protection Against Slavery in New Zealand 
 
 
Submitted for the LLB (Honours) Degree 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Faculty of Law 
Victoria University of Wellington 
2014  
LAWS489  300222728 
2 
The European Court of Human Rights decision in CN v The United Kingdom highlighted 
that slavery remains a modern problem.  It may no longer resemble the traditional picture 
of slavery dramatically presented by Hollywood but it is no less on an issue. Modern 
slavery is less visible; it is hidden away within homes, normal workplaces or in overseas 
factories.  This paper argues that New Zealand’s current treatment of slavery is 
inadequate exemplified by the absence of prosecutions.  Thorough protection of slavery 
requires clear definitions that courts can easily apply. This paper explores how the Bill of 
Rights could be used to remedy this situation.  This paper argues for the application of the 
Drittwirkung concept to give a horizontal effect to a right against slavery.  Furthermore it 
is argued that New Zealand is under positive obligations to actively prevent rights 
violations, not merely avoid them.  These positive obligations are a key component of 
modern human rights jurisprudence and can be read into the New Zealand Bill of Rights 
Act 1990. This paper speculates that one action courts could take is to undertake the 
development of a tort action against slavery. 
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I Introduction 
You may choose to look the other way but you can never say again that you did 
not know.             – William 
Wilberforce1 
Slavery is often characterised by images of slaves traipsing their chained and bleeding feet 
onto America-bound ships; towards the marketplace for sale; towards plantations to be 
worked until death.2  Many see Wilberforce’s abolition of slavery in the 1800s as a 
triumph of humanity over barbarity.3  Yet slavery is not merely a historic atrocity.  It is a 
present reality for nearly 30 million people worldwide.4  Once shipped across the Atlantic, 
slaves are now trafficked throughout the world.  Once trapped by chains, they are now 
hidden in basements and overseas factories.  Once openly justified through science and 
religion, slavery is now implicitly condoned by consumer choices and insatiable demand 
for cheaper products. 
World Cups, Olympic and Commonwealth Games have provoked controversy over the 
working conditions of those constructing the tournament infrastructure.5  Pressure is 
currently on Qatar to improve the labour standards of hundreds of thousands of migrant 
workers in advance of the 2022 World Cup.6  The clothing industry is similarly 
concerning.  In 2013 a Bangladeshi factory supplying Western brands collapsed, killing 
1100 workers who had been forced to enter the building despite safety concerns.7 
                                                 
1  “Who was William Wilberforce?” United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization 
<www.unesco.org>. 
2  Anti-Slavery International “What is Modern Slavery?” Anti-slavery <www.antislavery.org> at [1]. 
3  At [1]. 
4  Walk Free Foundation “The Global Slavery Index 2013” (2013) Walk Free Foundation 
<www.walkfreefou ndation.org> at 1. 
5  John Ray “China’s disabled children are sold into slavery as beggars” (22 July 2007) The Guardian 
<www.theguardian.com>; “Delhi’s Commonwealth Games slave labour shame” (2 February 2010) 
Herald Sun <www.heraldsun.com.au>; and Dave Zirin “Slave Labour? Mass Prisons? FIFA Mangles 
the World Cup and the Beautiful Game” (26 September 2013) The Nation <www.thenation.com>. 
6  Ian Black “Qatar promises to reform labour laws after outcry over ‘World Cup slaves’” (14 May 2014) 
The Guardian <www.theguardian.com>; Barbara Miller “Migrant workers dying after being treated as 
‘modern slaves’ by Qatar World Cup organisers, report claims” (27 September 2013) ABC News 
<www.abc.net.au>; and Omer Aziz and Murtaza Hussain “Qatar’s Showcase of Shame” (5 January 
2014) The New York Times <www.nytimes.com>. 
7  “Factory Collapse in Bangladesh” (24 April 2014) Institute for Global Labour and Human Rights 
<www.globallabourrights.org>; see also “Bangladesh building collapse kills over 1100 workers: 
Primark and Mango labels found” Labour Behind the Label <www.labourbehindthelabel.org>; and 
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New Zealand is no exception with approximately 500 people trapped in slavery situations.8  
Comparatively the average annual road toll is 300,9 and the homicide rate is 80.10  These 
issues both receive considerable media attention and government investment in 
preventative efforts.11  Yet slavery, occurring at a comparable frequency, is the subject of 
far less discussion and focused action.  Specific problem areas are foreign vessels fishing 
in New Zealand waters, and the construction, agriculture, restaurant and prostitution 
industries.12  Many women willingly enter New Zealand to work in the sex industry and 
are subsequently forced into exploitative situations.13  Especially concerning is the internal 
trafficking of underage girls for commercial sexual exploitation.14  Christchurch’s 
booming construction industry has fuelled exploitative migrant recruitment practices.15  
Recruited workers have their original contracts replaced upon arrival, their identity 
documents confiscated, substantial debts incurred against them and are crammed into 
degrading living conditions.16 
                                                                                                                                                   
Ruma Paul “Bangladesh accuses 17 over garment factory collapse” (15 June 2014) Reuters 
<www.reuters.com>. 
8  Contrast the New Zealand figure with that of Pakistan which has an estimated 2,000,000 enslaved 
people: Walk Free Foundation, above n 4, at 6, 9 and 91. 
9  “Road death statistics” (10 June 2014) New Zealand Transport Agency <www.nzta.govt.nz>. 
10  Police National Headquarters “NZ Crime Statistics: A Summary of Recorded and Resolved Offence 
Statistics” (2014) at 2. 
11  Ministry of Transport “Engagement Draft: Government Policy Statement on Land Transport” (June 
2014); and Ministry of Justice “Additional support for victims of serious crime” (May 2011) Ministry 
of Justice <www.justice.govt.nz>. 
12  Walk Free Foundation, above n 4, at 30–31 and 91; and United States Department of State “Trafficking 
in Persons Report” (2013) at 280. 
13  United States Department of State “Trafficking in Persons Report” (2009) at 222; see “Murdered sex 
worker was turning her life around, court hears” (11 February 2014) OneNews <www.tvnz.co.nz>; Rob 
Kidd “Gangs force sex trade on underage girls” (12 September 2012) Stuff News <www.stuff.co.nz>; 
and Elizabeth Binning “Teen prostitutes pimped out by gang members” NZ Herald (online ed, 
Auckland, 25 January 2008). 
14  According to one estimate there are potentially 200 under 18-year-olds working as prostitutes in New 
Zealand: United States Department of State “Trafficking in Persons Report” (2010) at 251; United 
States Department of State, above n 12, at 280; see Josh Dale “‘Girls of 12 working in young red light 
area’, say police” NZ Herald (online ed, Auckland, 12 June 2010). 
15  See Michael Morrah “Christchurch rebuild migrants face debts, cramped accommodation” (16 July 
2014) 3rd Degree <www.3news.co.nz>. 
16  Steph Lambert “Protecting the Vulnerable” (independent review by Justice Acts New Zealand, New 
Zealand, 2014) at 14. 
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New Zealand’s admirable human rights record does not afford room for complacency.17  
This paper argues that New Zealand needs to provide better protection against slavery by 
ensuring that the laws addressing it communicate clearly and prohibit explicitly the harm 
central to slavery, ownership of another human.  This paper will begin by looking at CN v 
The United Kingdom (CN v UK).18  This case demonstrated that slavery was inadequately 
addressed in the United Kingdom which breached its obligations under the Convention for 
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR).19  This paper will 
evaluate New Zealand’s protections against slavery.  Finally it will explore how the New 
Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (Bill of Rights) can be used to improve those protections 
and so satisfy New Zealand’s obligations regarding slavery.  In doing this the tort of 
privacy will be used as another example. 
II A Definition of Slavery 
Slavery, servitude and forced or compulsory labour are closely related offences that are 
often prohibited and prosecuted together.20  Slavery is “the status or condition of a person 
over whom any or all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership are exercised”.21  
The Australian High Court elaborated on these powers attaching to ownership.22  Those 
powers include: making a person an object of purchase; using a person and his or her 
labour in a substantially unrestricted manner; an entitlement to the fruits of a person’s 
labour without commensurate compensation; and controlling and restricting a person’s 
movement.23  Servitude is “an obligation to provide one’s services that is imposed by the 
use of coercion, and is to be linked with the concept of ‘slavery’”.24  Forced or compulsory 
labour is “all work or service which is extracted from any person under the menace of any 
                                                 
17  See generally (10 October 1989) 502 NZPD 13038. 
18  CN v The United Kingdom (2012) 56 EHRR 24 (ECHR). 
19  Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms CETS No 005 (opened for 
signature 4 November 1950, entered into force 3 September 1953). 
20  International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 999 UNTS 171 (signed 16 December 1966, entered 
into force 23 March 1976), art 8; and Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, above n 19, art 4. 
21  Slavery Convention 182 UNTS 51 (signed 25 September 1926, entered into force 7 July 1955), art 1 
(emphasis added). 
22  R v Tang (2008) 237 CLR 1; see also Pam Stewart “Tortious Remedies for Deliberate Wrongdoing to 
Victims of Human Trafficking and Slavery in Australia” (2011) 34(3) UNSW Law Journal 898 at 903. 
23  R v Tang, above n 22, at [26]; see also Stewart, above n 22, at 903. 
24  Siliadin v France (2006) 43 EHRR 16 (ECHR) at [124]. 
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penalty and for which the said person has not offered himself voluntarily”.25  These 
offences represent varying grades of severity but can occur simultaneously.26  Delineating 
the precise borders between these three offences is beyond the scope of this paper.27 
In recent years it has been suggested that human trafficking for exploitation is also a 
related concept.  Trafficking is concerned with the movement of individuals and is 
primarily an immigration issue.28  It is unclear to what extent trafficking should fall within 
international slavery provisions.29  Whilst slavery can be a purpose of human trafficking, 
slavery and trafficking are not synonymous.30  Failing to differentiate between them could 
result in slavery being overlooked as occurred in CN v UK.31  Trafficking must be treated 
as distinct. 
States are rarely directly responsible for slavery – it is largely a private and secret 
enterprise which states struggle to identify let alone prevent.32  There are numerous 
different forms of modern slavery involving relationships from the obviously exploitative 
to more subtle, complicated, fear-based dependencies.33  It is important to distinguish 
between slavery and poor employment situations.34  Late payment of wages, no holiday 
pay, non-guaranteed hours, poor health and safety conditions are examples of substandard 
                                                 
25  Convention Concerning Forced or Compulsory Labour (ILO No 29), 39 UNTS 55 (entered into force 1 
May 1932), art 2(1). 
26  Vladislava Stoyanova “Dancing On the Borders of Article 4: Human Trafficking and the European 
Court of Human Rights in the Ranstev Case” (2012) 30/2 NQHR 163 at 181 and 182. 
27  For ease of purpose, “slavery, servitude and forced or compulsory labour” will hereinafter be referred to 
as “slavery” unless otherwise indicated. 
28  Trafficking consists of three elements: (a) an action facilitating migration; (b) committed by certain 
means; (c) for the purpose of exploitation: Stoyanova “Dancing on the Borders of Article 4”, above n 
26, at 169–170 and 177; and Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, 
Especially Women and Children, Supplementing the United Nations Convention Against Transnational 
Organized Crime 2237 UNTS 319 (opened for signature 15 November 2000, entered into force 25 
December 2003). 
29  Stoyanova “Dancing on the Borders of Article 4”, above n 26, at 164. 
30  Stoyanova “Dancing on the Borders of Article 4”, above n 26, at 169–170 and 177. 
31  CN v The United Kingdom, above n 18, at [80].  
32  Manfred Nowak U.N. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: CCPR Commentary (2nd ed, NP Engel, 
Germany, 2005) at 195 and 196; and Walk Free Foundation, above n 4, at 10. 
33  Nowak, above n 32, at 195 and 196; Anti-Slavery International “What is Modern Slavery?”, above n 2, 
at [6]; and Walk Free Foundation, above n 4, at 10. 
34  International Labour Organization “Report I(B): The Cost of Coercion” (98th Conference Session 
Geneva, 2009) at [23]. 
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employment environments.35  However the temptation to announce these sorts of 
employment law breaches as slavery must be avoided.  The severity of true slavery 
situations, involving ownership of another human, must not be thus diminished. 
III CN v The United Kingdom 
This case demonstrates that, although abolished, slavery remains inadequately addressed, 
even in developed countries.  Particularly it illustrates how deficiency in legislation can 
leave slavery victims without remedy.  Furthermore it is an example of positive obligations 
being imposed on a state regarding slavery. 
A Facts 
The applicant was willingly smuggled into the United Kingdom in 2002.  Upon her arrival 
her vulnerability, isolation and fear were exploited by her captors to create dependency.  
She was sent to an elderly Iraqi couple where she worked for four years as a live-in carer.  
The majority of the forced labour indicators were present in her situation.36  In August 
2006 she managed to alert police.  Throughout the investigation the authorities focused on 
trafficking offences.37  A police unit specialising in trafficking ran the investigation.  
English law at the time only prohibited domestic servitude where trafficking had 
occurred.38  That offence was consequently not applicable because she had immigrated 
willingly.  Her solicitor requested investigation into other offences.  However the police 
concluded that there was no evidence of trafficking for exploitation even though slavery 
and forced labour were supposedly under investigation.39  They said there were no 
offences in English law that applied to her situation and she was left without a remedy.40  
In January 2008 the applicant lodged an application against the United Kingdom with the 
                                                 
35  Sylvia Yuan, Trudie Cain and Paul Spoonley “Temporary migrants as Vulnerable Workers: A literature 
review” (Ministry of Business, Innovation & Employment, 2014) at 9. 
36  The indicators are: (a) abuse of vulnerability; (b) deception; (c) restriction of movement; (d) isolation; 
(e) physical and sexual violence; (f) intimidation and threats; (g) retention of identity documents; (h) 
withholding of wages; (i) debt bondage; (j) abusive working and living conditions; and (k) excessive 
overtime. The applicant was a victim of indicators (a), (d), (c), (f), (g), (h), (i) and (k): CN v The United 
Kingdom, above n 18, at [20]; and Special Action Program to Combat Forced Labour “ILO indicators 
of Forced Labour” (1 October 2012) International Labour Organization <www.ilo.org>. 
37  CN v The United Kingdom, above n 18, at [76]. 
38  CN v The United Kingdom, above n 18, at [29]; see Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants 
etc) Act 2004, (UK) s 4. 
39  CN v The United Kingdom, above n 18, at [16] and [24]. 
40  At [16], [24] and [76]. 
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European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR).41  In 2009 the United Kingdom made slavery, 
servitude and forced or compulsory labour offences in accordance with the ECHR.42 
B Submissions 
The applicant claimed the United Kingdom was positively obligated to criminalise 
domestic servitude.43  It had breached that obligation by only criminalising conduct 
peripheral to domestic servitude.44  She argued that her treatment was consistent with that 
in Siliadin v France (Siliadin).45  Consequently the positive obligation to criminalise the 
specific conduct of the ECHR should be affirmed.46  She alleged that the police were 
ignorant of relevant factors regarding domestic servitude.47  Furthermore the lack of 
domestic law provisions at the time prevented effective investigation and prosecution of 
the perpetrators.48  The United Kingdom argued firstly that the investigation was not 
terminated because of an absence of applicable criminal offences.49  Rather there was 
insufficient evidence that she was a victim of domestic servitude.50  Secondly, it argued 
that criminalising aspects of slavery in various independent sections adequately satisfied 
the positive obligations.51 
C Decision 
The ECtHR came to three key conclusions.  Firstly, the applicant’s situation aroused 
credible suspicion that she had been a victim of domestic servitude.52  This obligated the 
Government to investigate.53  Article 4 imposes specific positive obligations on member 
states to penalise and prosecute slavery.54  These involve operational measures to protect 
victims and procedural obligations to investigate suspected violations.55  Secondly, the 
                                                 
41  At [1]. 
42  At [31]; and Coroners and Justice Act 2009 (UK), s 71. 
43  CN v The United Kingdom, above n 18, at [42] and [51]. 
44  At [42] and [51]. 
45  At [42], [48] and [51]; and Siliadin v France, above n 24. 
46  CN v The United Kingdom, above n 18, at [42], [48] and [51]. 
47  At [49]–[50]. 
48  At [49]–[50]. 
49  Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants etc) Act, above n 38, s 4. 
50  Section 4. 
51  CN v The United Kingdom, above n 18, at [53]–[54] and [56]. 
52  At [70]–[72]. 
53  At [70]–[72]. 
54  At [66], [67] and [69]. 
55  At [66], [67] and [69]. 
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United Kingdom’s legislation provided insufficient protection against the art 4 conduct.  
As in Siliadin the relevant legislation was “not sufficiently specific” and “too restrictive”.56  
The Court pointed to the increasingly high standard of rights protection expected 
internationally.57  Accordingly there is a need to specifically criminalise domestic 
servitude not just associated behaviours.58  Thirdly, the Court confirmed that the failure to 
pay attention to the complex factors of domestic servitude was due to the legislation’s 
trafficking focus.59  The provision of an inadequate investigation violated art 4.60 
IV New Zealand’s Legal Situation 
A Criminal Law 
Akin to the previous United Kingdom position, New Zealand’s legal protections and 
remedies provide insufficient protection against slavery.61  Criminalisation is required to 
address slavery.  Unfortunately worldwide most slavery legislation is poorly enforced and 
New Zealand is no exception.62  In New Zealand slavery and forced labour are 
criminalised in ss 98 and 98AA of the Crimes Act 1961 with maximum sentences of 14 
years.63  These provisions are independent of the trafficking offences.64  However the lack 
of clear, delineated and internationally consistent definitions inhibits effective prosecution 
of slavery. 
                                                 
56  At [75]; and Siliadin v France, above n 24, at [142]. 
57  CN v The United Kingdom, above n 18, at [75]; see generally Recommendation 1523 (2001) of the 
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe at [9]. 
58  CN v The United Kingdom, above n 18, at [75]; see generally Recommendation 1523, above n 57, at 
[9]. 
59  CN v The United Kingdom, above n 18, at [80]–[82]. 
60  At [80]–[82]; in Kawogo v The United Kingdom (56921/09) Chamber, ECHR 3 September 2013 an 
analogous situation arose and the applicant’s claim was dismissed, largely due to the Government’s 
admission that the domestic criminal law was inadequate at the time. 
61  Habeas corpus does not provide protection against slavery in New Zealand despite the decision in 
Somerset v Stewart (1722) 98 ER 499. Somerset did not free all slaves, it stood only for the rule that no 
slave could be forcibly removed from England: Paul D Halliday Habeas Corpus: From England to 
Empire (Harvard University Press, Cambridge (United States of America), 2010) at 175; and Linda Ali 
and John Siblon “Slave of Free?” Black Presence <www.nationalarchives.gov.uk>. 
62  Walk Free Foundation, above n 4, at 10. 
63  Crimes Act 1961, s 98 and s 98AA.  Note that while art 7, ss 1 and 2 of the International Crimes and 
International Criminal Court Act 2000 prohibit “enslavement”, they do not apply to isolated incidents 
of slavery so do not address the conduct at issue in this paper. 
64  Lambert, above n 16, at 20. 
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Section 98(2) defines a slave as including, “without limitation, a person subject to debt-
bondage or serfdom”.65  While this definition is framed to allow flexibility, it does not 
encapsulate the “right of ownership” central to international definitions of slavery.66  It 
also has been framed to include servitude.  The definition of serfdom in s 98(2) bears close 
resemblance to the ECtHR’s definition of servitude.67  As discussed above slavery and 
servitude are related but correspond to different levels of severity.68  Their amalgamation 
thus reveals a limited understanding of the nature and circumstances giving rise to each of 
them.  If courts read this provision down towards servitude this could diminish the 
perceived gravity of the offence.  Alternatively if courts read this provision up towards 
slavery, servitude-type situations that do not meet the threshold for slavery may slip 
through the cracks.  Both situations impair the effectiveness of any protection offered. 
Section 98AA prohibits sexual exploitation, removal of body parts and forced labour.69  
Whilst sexual exploitation is defined extensively, forced labour is not at all.70  This is 
partly explained by s 98AA having been introduced to comply with a children’s rights 
convention.71  The inclusion of forced labour was merely incidental to the primary concern 
– protecting children from sexual exploitation.  The protection offered against forced 
labour is thus less comprehensive than it ought to be. 
                                                 
65  Crimes Act 1961, above n 63, s 98 defines serfdom as: 
the status or condition of a tenant who is by any law, custom or agreement bound to live 
and labour on land belonging to another person and to render some determinate service 
to that other person, whether for reward or not, and who is not free to change that status 
or condition. 
  And debt bondage is: 
the status or condition arising from a pledge by a debtor of his or her personal services, 
or of the personal services of any person under his or her control, as security for a debt, 
if the value of those services, as reasonably assessed, is not applied towards the 
liquidation of the debt or if the length and nature of those services are not limited and 
defined. 
66  United States Department of State, above n 12, at 280; United Nations Supplementary Convention on 
the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and the Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery 226 
UNTS 3 (opened for signature 7 September 1956, entered into force 30 April 1957), art 1; Slavery 
Convention, above n 21, art 1; see also Siliadin v France, above n 24, at [122]. 
67  See Siliadin v France, above n 24, at [123]; and Crimes Act 1961, above n 63, s 98(2). 
68  International Labour Organization, above n 34, at [43]. 
69  Crimes Act 1961, above n 63, s 98AA. 
70  Section 98AA(3)–(6). 
71  (2 March 2004) 615 NZPD 11472; and Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child 
on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography 2171 UNTS 227 (opened for 
signature 25 May 2000, entered into force 18 January 2002). 
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Action against slavery is currently inhibited by the lack of prosecutions.72  This is due in 
part to a lack of understanding of the nature of enslavement itself attributable to the 
deficient definitions described above.73  For example in 2001 fifteen smuggled Thai 
women were forced into prostitution and their earnings were confiscated to repay imposed 
debts.74  The culprits were never convicted because the police believed the absence of 
physical restraints meant the case would likely fail.75  Yet a number of the forced labour 
indicators were present.76  There is some evidence that courts have been choosing to 
prosecute under employment or immigration provisions rather than under ss 98 and 
98AA.77  To improve the investigative processes and secure more convictions for slavery 
offences, greater knowledge of slavery is necessary.  A clearer definition of slavery and 
greater judicial awareness of the aforementioned indicators would help courts know when 
and how to apply ss 98 and 98AA. 
One successful prosecution under s 98 involved a man being convicted of selling a woman 
as a slave.78  He had assisted her entry into the country and lived off her earnings before 
offering to sell her to an undercover police officer.79  He was found guilty under s 98(1)(a) 
and (j) and sentenced to five years imprisonment followed by deportation.80  The Court of 
Appeal said that slavery is submission to domination where domination means “control 
and authority that brooks no opposition or disobedience”.81  There was no reference to 
ownership.  However in awarding the sentence the Judge equated the accused’s behaviour 
with rape and emphasised the need to deter others from acting similarly.82  This was 
                                                 
72  United States Department of State, above n 12, at 280. 
73  At 280. 
74  Susan Glazebrook, Justice “Human Trafficking and NZ” (keynote address to AGM of the NZ Women 
Judges Association, Auckland, 13 August 2010) at 9. 
75  At 9. 
76  Special Action Program to Combat Forced Labour, above n 36. 
77  There have been other cases involving breaches of various employment law statutes which could most 
likely have also been prosecuted under ss 98 and 98AA: see Elliott v Kirk ET Auckland AET581/00, 19 
February 2001; R v Rahimi CA4/02, 30 April 2002; see generally Thomas Harré “Human trafficking in 
New Zealand: a review of recent case law” (17 Jan 2014) NZ Lawyer 
<www.nzlawyermagazine.co.nz>. 
78  R v Decha-Iamsakun [1993] 1 NZLR 141 (CA). 
79  At 142. 
80  At 142. 
81  At 144. 
82  At 148. 
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recognition of the seriousness of slavery which should be emulated in other cases.  The 
approach could have been further improved through reference to the concept of ownership. 
B Tort Law 
There are a number of civil actions that could provide some protection to victims of 
slavery. These include the torts of assault, battery, false imprisonment, deceit and mental 
injury.83  Assault’s requirement that there be an intentional act causing apprehension of 
physical contact and battery’s requirement of an intentional act of contact with the 
plaintiff’s body will often be satisfied in slavery incidents.84  False imprisonment requires 
the “total deprivation of liberty” of the plaintiff.85  This can include psychological 
imprisonment achieved through threats or assertions of authority.86  The tort of deceit is 
primarily applicable in commercial situations so would need some extension before it 
could be properly useful in slavery situations.  Action for mental injury is generally 
available in New Zealand.87  However work-related mental injury and mental injury 
caused by sexual offences are covered by the Accident Compensation Act 2001.88  To the 
extent that slavery situations are considered “employment” a tort action for mental injury 
is thus unavailable.   
Whilst these torts may be applicable in some slavery situations there are several issues.  
Firstly, not all slavery situations will be covered by all of these torts.  This could lead to 
inconsistent treatment of slavery in the courts and victims receiving different remedies.  
Secondly, whilst these torts indeed provide some remedy for victims they do not address 
the issue at the heart of slavery.  There is a difference between an assault in a bar fight and 
being threatened during enslavement.  Slavery is one of the most serious violations of 
human rights involving ownership of another human being.  The severity of this sort of 
behaviour should not be diminished by association with lesser offences.  Consequently the 
current tort actions do not provide sufficient protection against slavery. 
                                                 
83  Stewart, above n 22, at 908. 
84  At 909. 
85  At 910. 
86  Stephen Todd (ed) The Law of Torts in New Zealand (5th ed, Brookers, Wellington, 2009) at [4.5.01]; 
see generally Stewart, above n 22, at 911. 
87  Todd, above n 86, at [5.7]. 
88  Accident Compensation Act 2001, s21 and 21B; and Todd, above n 86, at [2.4.03]. 
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C Other Measures 
It should be noted that although New Zealand has extensive employment regulations there 
are nonetheless some types of workers unprotected by that regime.  These can include 
contractors, triangle employment arrangements, illegal workers and migrant workers.89  
The Government has taken steps towards monitoring high risk industries.90  However New 
Zealand does not have a law enforcement unit specifically trained to identify, prevent, 
monitor and address modern slavery situations.91  There needs to be further investigation 
into how the basic employment rights given to employees can be extended to all workers.92 
V A Bill of Rights Interpretation 
The question then is whether the Bill of Rights can be used to interpret the Crimes Act 
sections in a way that provides the protection required under New Zealand’s positive 
obligations.  
A Slavery and the Bill of Rights 
Slavery is not contained in the Bill of Rights.  Given that slavery is primarily committed 
by private individuals (see Part II) it can be classified as a horizontal right.93  However the 
Bill of Rights supposedly applies to vertical rights where there is state action satisfying s 
3.94  Furthermore the Bill of Rights focuses more on procedural rights than substantive 
rights.95  However with the doctrine of positive obligations, discussed below, the exclusion 
of slavery on that basis should be considered flawed – judicial action in private slavery 
cases would have to comply. 
The absence of a constitutional provision weakens the protections offered against slavery 
however the absence does not itself breach New Zealand’s positive obligations.  
Constitutional provisions often provoke the development of other laws, serve an educative 
function and filter new law.  Alone they are insufficient to satisfy positive obligations.  
Despite the United Kingdom’s constitutional protections against slavery it still breached its 
                                                 
89  Lambert, above n 16, at 24. 
90  United States Department of State, above n 12, at 281. 
91  Walk Free Foundation, above n 4, at 92. 
92  See Lambert, above n 16, at 24 and 32 for a more information. 
93  Horizontal rights are rights that occur between individuals whereas vertical rights occur between the 
individual and the state: Nowak, above n 32, at 39 and 195; see also Geoffrey Palmer “A Bill of Rights 
for New Zealand: A White Paper” [1984–1985] I AJHR A6 at [10.12]. 
94  Palmer, above n 93, at [10.12]. 
95  (10 October 1989) 5502 NZPD 13040. 
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positive obligations in CN v UK.96  The ECtHR focused more on practical operational 
measures to protect victims.97 
The absence of slavery could be ameliorated somewhat by reading it in.  It seems to fits 
best with the right not to be subjected to torture or cruel treatment.98  The Bill of Rights is 
to be read generously and in light of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR).99  Some academics consider that the ICCPR cannot be used to fill gaps in 
the Bill of Rights deliberately left by Parliament.100  However the treatment of privacy 
indicates that where the ICCPR has not been transposed, missing rights may be read in to 
provide at least some protection.101  Reading slavery into torture is the next best alternative 
even though slavery is still denied the prominence and protection it would have received 
through express inclusion in the Bill of Rights. 
In both Hosking v Runting (Hosking) and C v Holland the Court read privacy into the right 
against unreasonable search and seizure.102  Privacy was an existing legal value and its 
absence from the Bill of Rights did not constitute its “legislative rejection”.103  Unless 
Parliament explicitly restricts development in a particular area, courts can consider 
themselves free to develop the common law.104  Courts may even be obligated to do so 
where international values have been ratified by New Zealand.105 
In Ranstev v Cyprus and Russia the ECtHR addressed the torture and slavery allegations 
together because of their similarities.106  The word treatment has been read as applying to 
all behaviour inconsistent with human dignity and value, not just criminal justice and 
                                                 
96  Human Rights Act 1998 (UK), Schedule 1. 
97  CN v The United Kingdom, above n 18, at [67]. 
98  New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 9. 
99  International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, above n 20; see Andrew Butler and Petra Butler 
The New Zealand Bill of Rights: a commentary (LexisNexis, New Zealand, 2005) at [4.2.3]–[4.2.5]. 
100  Butler and Butler, above n 99, at [4.5.2] and [4.5.11]; see for example R v Barlow (1995) 2 HRNZ 635 
(CA) at 655. 
101  New Zealand Bill of Rights Act, above n 98, s 28. 
102  Hosking v Runting [2005] 1 NZLR 1 (CA) at [60]; C v Holland [2012] NZHC 2155 at [25]; see also R v 
Williams [2007] NZCA 52, [2007] 3 NZLR 207 at [48]; and R v Hamed [2011] 2 NZSC 101, [2012] 2 
NZLR 305. 
103  Hosking v Runting, above n 102, at [92]; and C v Holland , above n 102, at [28]–[31]. 
104  Hosking v Runting, above n 102, at [228] per Tipping J; and C v Holland , above n 102, at [81]. 
105  C v Holland , above n 102, at [69]. 
106  Ranstev v Cyprus and Russia (2010) 51 EHRR 1 (ECHR) at [252]; and Roza Pati “States’ Positive 
Obligations with Respect to Human Trafficking: The European Court of Human Rights Breaks New 
Ground in Ranstev v Cyprus and Russia” (2011) 29 BUInt’l LJ 79 at 90. 
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disciplinary processes.107  Slavery is certainly inconsistent with human dignity and value.  
Rights such as freedom of movement, right to liberty and right to justice are too narrow 
themselves to allow slavery to be read in.108  However taking a schematic approach to the 
Bill of Rights they can be used to strengthen the argument for reading slavery into 
torture.109 
B Section 6 Analysis 
Section 6 requires the preference of a Bill of Rights consistent meaning of an enactment.110  
Parliament should specify if it does not intend to affirm the Bill of Rights.111  However 
courts “cannot rewrite or legislate”.112  The goal of applying s 6 to s 98 of the Crimes Act 
is to read the definition of slave widely enough to incorporate the idea of ownership 
inherent in other definitions of slavery.  The phrase “includes, without limitation” means 
slavery could include behaviour other than debt bondage or serfdom.  This would certainly 
be more consistent with the Bill of Rights than restricting the scope to only those 
behaviours.  However exercising ownership over another human being is a severe action.  
Reading that into s 98 is not something the courts should do absent a legislative mandate.  
Furthermore the separate offence of servitude could not simply be added in.  Regarding s 
98AA, a meaning of forced labour consistent with the Bill of Rights could be found by 
using the definition contained in Part II of this paper.  However the other two behaviours 
in s 98AA are sexual exploitation and removal of body parts.  To read forced labour as 
referring to “all work or service” extracted involuntarily and under threats is to introduce a 
very different and quite substantial concept into the section.  It does not fit well. 
Reading ss 98 and 98AA consistently with the Bill of Rights certainly improves the 
situation.  However it still does not provide the comprehensive protection against slavery 
that is necessary.  This can be illustrated by a comparison with the Australian legislation.  
The Australian Criminal Code Act slavery provisions are internationally regarded as well-
                                                 
107  Butler and Butler, above n 99, at [10.1.4], [10.3.1] and [10.9.1]; and Palmer, above n 93, at [10.162]. 
108  New Zealand Bill of Rights Act, above n 98, s 18, 22 and 27. 
109  Compare this with the values approach used in Germany and India as discussed in Part VII of this 
paper. 
110  New Zealand Bill of Rights Act, above n 98, s 6. 
111  Ministry of Transport v Noort [1992] 3 NZLR 260 (CA) at 287 per Hardie Boys J; see also Butler and 
Butler, above n 99, at [7.10.1]. 
112  Quilter v Attorney-General [1998] 1 NZLR 523 (CA) at 572 per Tipping J; see also Butler and Butler, 
above n 99, at [7.11.2]. 
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crafted with clear definitions and distinctions between behaviours.113  Slavery, servitude 
and forced or compulsory labour are separately defined and prohibited using wording 
consistent with international definitions.114  Even a wide interpretation of the Crimes Act 
could not achieve the precise and comprehensive protection offered by the Australian Act. 
VI Alternative Approaches 
To the extent that the Bill of Rights is unable to remedy the defects in the Crimes Act there 
are two alternative ways the Bill of Rights can provide protection against slavery.  Firstly, 
Drittwirkung is a concept by which human rights can be invoked in the private sphere 
because they have a horizontal effect as well as a vertical one.115  Courts must interpret and 
apply the law between private parties consistently with human rights.116  Secondly, New 
Zealand is under positive obligations to protect against slavery.  This means that New 
Zealand must actively prevent slavery occurring within its jurisdiction even when 
committed by private individuals. 
VII Drittwirkung 
Protecting against slavery, a predominantly horizontal right, requires more than mere state 
non-action.117  Modern slavery is undertaken primarily by private parties so effective 
protection must apply privately.  However citizens cannot ordinarily invoke the Bill of 
Rights against one another.118  Nonetheless the Bill of Rights can apply in the private 
sphere through the application of the Drittwirkung concept.  Its implication is that courts, 
in their application of both legislation and the common law, can extend those private 
relationships in order to protect the rights contained in the Bill of Rights.  The key 
                                                 
113  Vladislava Stoyanova “Article 4 of the ECHR and the Obligation of Criminalising Slavery, Servitude, 
Forced Labour and Human Trafficking” (2014) 3(2) CJICL 407 at 441; and Criminal Code Act 1995 
(Cth). 
114  Criminal Code Act, above n 113, s 270–271. 
115  Drittwirkung refers to the effect of human rights between private parties. Horizontalwirkung is similar 
but also includes obligations on states to take measures to protect human rights against private 
violation: Chava Schwebel “Welfare Rights in Canadian and German Constitutional Law” (2011) 
12(11) GLJ 1902 at 1926; BVerfGE, 7, 198 I. Senate (1 BvR 400/51) Lüth, Federal Republic of 
Germany, Federal Constitutional Court; and Nowak, above n 31, at 39. 
116  Schwebel, above n 115, at 1926; and BVerfGE, 7, 198 I. Senate (1 BvR 400/51) Lüth, above n 115. 
117  Nowak, above n 32, at 196. 
118  New Zealand Bill of Rights Act, above n 98, s 3; (10 October 1989) 502 NZPD 13040; and Jan 
Stemplewitz “Horizontal rights and freedoms: an analysis of the role and effect of the New Zealand Bill 
of Rights Act 1990 in private litigation” (LLM Research Paper, Victoria University of Wellington, 
2005) at 1. 
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objection to this is that s 3 of the Bill of Rights limits its application to state and public 
functions.  It is argued that the Bill of Rights cannot reach into areas of life where personal 
autonomy is unaffected by the state.119 
However most private conduct is regulated by law and to that extent is public.120  
Therefore the public bodies that create and monitor those private laws must, as they do so, 
apply the Bill of Rights.121  This requires more than the mere compliance of procedural 
rules; the substantive outcomes of those processes must involve an application of the Bill 
of Rights also.  Rights thus do affect the “structuring of relationships under private law”.122  
A private individual claiming under existing legislation or common law is able to “demand 
a Bill of Rights consistent judicial determination”.123  The real controversy arises when 
giving effect to the Bill of Rights would require the courts to significantly alter existing 
causes of action or to create new ones entirely.124  For instance a slavery victim might sue 
for assault but fail to prove the requisite elements.  Despite this, the courts, recalling that 
slavery can be read into the Bill of Rights, might determine that to adequately protect the 
victim and give effect to the Bill of Rights in this context the development of a tort of 
slavery is necessary.  Similarly, where statutes contain ambiguous terms, Drittwirkung 
works to allow courts to expand rights protections.125  Given the above s 6 analysis of the 
Crimes Act, the common law application of Drittwirkung is more useful with regard to 
slavery. 
Some support for this private sphere application of human rights can be found in the New 
Zealand case law.126  Unlike Blanchard J who was reluctant to apply the Bill of Rights to 
the substance of the judiciary’s judgments, later cases have not been so conservative.127  In 
Lange v Atkinson Elias J distinguished the Canadian approach because the Canadian 
                                                 
119  Murray Hunt “Human Rights Review and the Public-Private Distinction” in Grant Huscroft and Paul 
Rishworth (eds) Litigating Rights: Perspectives from Domestic and International Law (Hart Publishing, 
United States of America, 2002) 3 at 77. 
120  Ian Brownlie (ed) Human Rights in the Private Sphere (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1993) at 94 
and 131–132; and Stemplewitz, above n 118, at 6 and 9. 
121  Stemplewitz, above n 118, at 6 and 9. 
122  Nowak, above n 32, at 39. 
123  Stemplewitz, above n 118, at 14. 
124  At 17 and 25. 
125  See Butler and Butler, above n 99, at [5.3.3] and [5.6.6]–[5.6.8]. 
126  Brownlie, above n 120, at 341; Hunt, above n 199, at 76; and Butler and Butler, above n 99, at [5.8.10]. 
127  Hunt, above n 119, at 75; see Television NZ Ltd v Newsmonitor Services Ltd [1994] 2 NZLR 91(HC). 
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Charter does not refer to judicial acts as is done by s 3 of the Bill of Rights.128  She said 
that “[i]t is idle to suggest that the common law need not conform to the judgments in such 
legislation.”129  The Canadian approach was enunciated in a libel case between private 
parties.130  The Court said that without state attributable acts Charter rights are not 
actionable.131  In private cases the common law must be applied consistently with the 
Charter however it cannot be revised and supplemented in the way discussed above merely 
to give effect to the Charter.132  Paul Rishworth would have New Zealand adhere to the 
Canadian approach, characterising the Bill of Rights merely as a limitation on state 
action.133 
Nonetheless in both Solicitor-General v Radio NZ and Duff v Communicado (Duff) the Bill 
of Rights was applied “to acts done by the judicial branch of the Government”.134  In fact 
the High Court in Duff explicitly indicated that this finding applied generally to the 
common law.135  Tipping J in Hosking said that whilst the Bill of Rights regulates the 
relationship between the state and its citizens:136 
…it will often be appropriate for the values which are recognised in that context 
to inform the development of the common law in its function of regulating 
relationships between citizen and citizen. 
Consequently courts must apply the substance of the law to private situations in a way that 
gives effect to the Bill of Rights.  When slavery arises before the courts, the courts would 
be obligated to use the Bill of Rights to remedy the deficient protections currently 
provided and address the behaviours at the core of slavery. 
                                                 
128  Lange v Atkinson [1997] 2 NZLR 22 (HC) at 33; see generally Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK) RSC 
1982 c 11, s 32(1); see also Butler and Butler, above n 99, at [5.2.8]. 
129  Lange v Atkinson, above n 128, at 33. 
130  Hill v Church of Scientology of Toronto [1995] 2 SCR 1130 at [82]. 
131  At [95]. 
132  At [95]; see also Dolphin Delivery Ltd v Retail, Wholesale and Department Store Union Local 580 
[1986] 2 SCR 573. 
133  Hunt, above n 119, at 77. 
134  Solicitor-General v Radio NZ Ltd [1994] 1 NZLR 48 (HC) at 58; and Duff v Communicado Ltd [1995] 
3 NZLR 739 (HC) at 99. 
135  Duff v Communicado Ltd, above n 134, at 99. 
136  Hosking v Runting, above n 102, at [229] per Tipping J. 
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VIII Positive Obligations 
Arguably the common law cannot be fully subject to the Bill of Rights unless there are 
positive obligations upon the state.137  The ultimate effect of these would be that New 
Zealand is obligated to remedy the current slavery protections even though it concerns acts 
between private parties.138  This could be done in a variety of ways from the courts 
developing new causes of action to Parliament amending old or introducing new 
legislation. 
A Doctrine of Positive Obligations 
Historically human rights were concerned with preventing state action, not requiring it.139  
Recently the language of human rights instruments has suggested something more: 
positive obligations.  States are obligated to exercise due diligence to prevent and remedy 
human rights violations.140  Failure to do so results in state liability even when the actual 
violation was committed by a non-state actor.141  It is not that states are responsible for 
every human rights abuse incident.142  The distinct injuries occurring must be fairly 
attributed between the non-state actor and the state.  For instance an act of torture produces 
individual culpability, but the failure to sufficiently deter or subsequently prosecute 
produces state culpability.143  The responsibility under due diligence is to avoid the state-
attributable harm.144 
                                                 
137  Stemplewitz, above n 118, at 26. 
138  Stemplewitz, above n 118, at 17 and 25; and Brownlie, above n 120, at 342. 
139  Danwoood Mzikenge Chirwa “State Responsibility for Human Rights” in Mashood A Baderin and 
Manisuli Ssenyonjo (eds) International Human Rights Law: Six Decades after the UDHR and Beyond 
(Ashgate Publishing, Farnham (England), 2010) 397 at 397, 404 and 410; and H Lauterpacht 
International Law and Human Rights (2nd ed, Stevens & Sons, London, 1951) at 155. 
140  Chirwa, above n 139, at 404–406; and Daniel Augenstein State Responsibilities to Regulate and 
Adjudicate Corporate Activities Under the European Convention on Human Rights (Submission to the 
Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General (SRSG) on the issue of Human Rights 
and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Entities, 2011) at [9]. 
141  Chirwa, above n 139, at 407; see generally Corfu Channel (United Kingdom v Albania) [1949] ICJ Rep 
4. 
142  Brownlie, above n 120, at 108 and 215; and Human Rights Committee General Comment 20: Article 7 
HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1 (1994). 
143  Robert P Barnidge “The Due Diligence Principle Under International Law” (2006) 81 Int CL Rev 121 
at 21. 
144  This approach is advocated by the non-repression theory which has been favoured by some over the 
“presumed complicity theory of state responsibility”.  The latter requires states to have some knowledge 
or a credible suspicion of the threat of a right being violated: Barnidge, above n 143, at 20 and 21–22. 
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Positive obligations are a combination of express textual requirements and “implied 
judicial creations”.145  A number of articles in the ICCPR and the ECHR, such as slavery 
and propaganda for war, contain express positive obligations.146  The application of these 
is not controversial.147  However their scope is the subject of much jurisprudence.148  
States are given a wide margin of appreciation with criminal provisions only being 
required in the most severe circumstances.149 
The ECtHR has also implied positive obligations in other articles.  Respecting rights 
means avoiding violating them.150  However the general requirement to protect, ensure and 
fulfil rights gives rise to the further obligation of guaranteeing them for others.151  The 
Court often combines a general provision with a substantive provision to create a positive 
obligation.152  They use the principle of effectiveness to give provisions “the fullest weight 
and effect consistent with the language used and with the rest of the text”.153  The Court’s 
goal in interpreting the ECHR should be promoting human rights not limiting state 
responsibility.154  The Court has consequently implied positive obligations in otherwise 
                                                 
145  Alastair Mowbray The Development of Positive Obligations under the European Convention on Human 
Rights by the European Court of Human Rights (Hart Publishing, United States of America, 2004) at 2. 
146  International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, above n 20, art 6(1), 8, 10, 17(2), 20, 23(1) and 
24(1); and Nowak, above n 32, at 39. 
147  Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights State Responsibility to Regulate 
and Adjudicate Corporate Activities under the United Nations’ core Human Rights Treaties (2007) at 
[18]. 
148  At [18]. 
149  Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, above n 147, at [18], [48]; see MC 
v Bulgaria (2005) 40 EHRR 20 (ECHR) at [150] and [2] per Tulkens J; and X and Y v The Netherlands 
(1985) 8 EHRR 235 (ECHR) at [24] and [27]. 
150  Chirwa, above n 139, at 405; see generally Universal Declaration of Human Rights GA Res 217, 
A/Res/217 (1948); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, above n 20, art 2; and 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, above n 19, art 1 and 13. 
151  Chirwa, above n 139, at 405; Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 
above n 147, at 4; see generally Universal Declaration of Human Rights, above n 150; International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, above n 20, art 2; and Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, above n 19, art 1 and 13. 
152  Mowbray, The Development of Positive Obligations under the European Convention on Human rights 
by the European Court of Human Rights, above n 145, at 44; and Augenstein, above n 140, at [9]. 
153  JG Merrills The Development of International Law By The International Court of Human Rights 
(Manchester University Press, Manchester (United Kingdom), 1988) at 89 and 94. 
154  Brownlie, above n 120, at 177; and Andrew Clapham Human Rights in the Private Sphere (Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 1993) at 189. 
LAWS489  300222728 
23 
negatively framed rights.155  The principle of effectiveness is also relevant to determining 
the scope of obligations.156 
It is into this determination of scope that the margin of appreciation becomes important.157  
Positive obligations have made even further inroads into state sovereignty than human 
rights in general.158  Governments may be compelled by an external party to take domestic 
actions.  The ECtHR wishes to protect the sovereignty of states by not legislating for them, 
especially regarding more controversial issues.159  Consequently states may often choose 
which measures they will undertake to meet their positive obligations.160  Defective legal 
regimes, lack of procedural safeguards and issues regarding important aspects of 
individual existence tend to result in narrower margins.161  Political controversy and lack 
of international consensus result in wider margins.162 
B New Zealand’s Positive Obligations 
This section explores the reasoning behind imposing positive obligations on New Zealand.  
This is done through looking at domestic cases, Human Rights Committee (HRC) and 
ECtHR jurisprudence, the jurisprudence of other states and policy reasons.  The 
consequence of these obligations is that New Zealand is obligated to provide better 
protection against slavery than currently exists. 
                                                 
155  Merrills, above n 153, at 94. 
156  At 94. 
157  Marckx v Belgium (1979) 2 EHRR 330 (ECHR) at [4] per Matscher J. 
158  Nicolas Politis The New Aspect of International Law (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 
Washington, 1928) at 7; C Wilfred Jenks A New World of Law? (Longmans, Green & Co, London, 
1969) at 10; and Christine Chinkin Third Parties in International Law (Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 1993) at 3. 
159  Brownlie, above n 120, at 344; and George Letsas A Theory of Interpretation of the European 
Convention on Human Rights (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007) at 90. 
160  Augenstein, above n 140, at [23]; and Fadeyeva v Russia (2005) 45 EHRR 10 (ECHR) at [89] and [92]. 
161  Jana Gajdošová “Article 8 ECHR and Its Impact on English Law” (LLB (PhD) Thesis, University of 
East Anglia, Law School, 2008) at 202; see generally Goodwin v United Kingdom (2002) 35 EHRR 18 
(ECHR); Odièvre v France (2004) 38 EHRR 43 (ECHR) and Mizzi v Malta (2006) 38 EHRR 43 
(ECHR). 
162  For instance there tends to be less uniformity across regarding economic, social and environmental 
issues.  Letas, above n 159, at 91; Gajdošová, above n 161, at 157–158 and 202; see generally Evans v 
The United Kingdom (2006) 43 EHRR 21 (ECHR); Botta v Italy (1998) 26 EHRR 241 (ECHR); and 
Hatton v United Kingdom 37 EHRR 28 (ECHR). 
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1 New Zealand cases 
Few New Zealand courts have engaged in discussions about positive obligations and 
certainly none in regard to slavery.  Where the issue of positive obligations has arisen 
courts have tended to focus very narrowly on the facts, refusing to make a general 
statement of the law.  The following five cases indicate the general approach taken towards 
positive obligations. 
Sharma v ANZ Banking Group concerned freedom from unreasonable search and 
seizure.163  Bailiffs had failed to discriminate between the appellant’s property and his 
wife’s property.164  Whilst his claims regarding the bailiffs’ behaviour failed, it was 
suggested that, had he and his wife combined their claim, a new cause of action may have 
arisen from the Bill of Rights despite being a private situation.165  In Mendelssohn v 
Attorney-General the Court of Appeal said that in that case freedom of religion was a 
negative freedom so no positive action was expected of the state to protect it.166  However 
the Court also said that some parts of the Bill of Rights do expressly impose positive 
obligations.167  Additionally, in some circumstances, positive obligations may arise out of 
negative rights.168   
In Shortland v Northland Health Ltd the Court of Appeal said the right to life did not 
obligate the state to provide expensive medical treatment to a man with kidney failure.169  
Whilst New Zealand courts have not yet explored the full extent of the state’s obligation to 
protect life this case indicates that the scope of obligations will be limited in some 
circumstances.170  Clark v Governor-General concerned positive obligations regarding 
torture.171  The plaintiff argued ss 9 and 23(5) of the Bill of Rights had been breached by 
                                                 
163  Sharma v ANZ Banking Group [1990–1992] 3 NZBORR 183 (CA). 
164  At [6]; and Butler and Butler, above n 99, at [5.8.21]. 
165  Sharma v ANZ Banking Group, above n 163; and Butler and Butler, above n 99, at [5.8.21]. 
166  Mendelssohn v Attorney-General [1999] 2 NZLR 268 (CA) at [6] and [14]. 
167  R v N (No 2) (1999) 5 HRNZ 72 (CA) at [15]. 
168  At [20]. 
169  Shortland v Northland Health Ltd [1998] 1 NZLR 433 (CA); and David Hart “The Impact of Human 
Rights on Medical Law” (paper published for One Crown Office Row, United Kingdom, October 
2002). 
170  Ministry of Justice “Guidelines on the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990” (November 2004) 
Ministry of Justice <www.justice.govt.nz>. 
171  Clark v Governor-General (2005) HC Wellington CIV-2004-485-1902, 27 May 2005 at [30] per 
Associate Judge Gendall; and Daksha Priya Raniga “International Obligations and Sections 9 & 23(5) 
of the Bill of Rights” (LLB (Hons) Research Paper, Victoria University of Wellington, 2007) at 27. 
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the Government’s failure to provide education, investigate allegations, review processes 
and protect against torture.172  The Government contended that no such obligations were 
expressly or impliedly included in those sections.173  The Judge held that the incorporation 
of those obligations depended on their justiciability.174  Education and reviews were non-
justiciable because they were too political an issue.  Impartial investigation and protection 
of claimants were justiciable because they are essential to the right against torture.175  
However on these facts the latter actions had been carried out by the Government so a final 
decision on incorporation of positive obligations was unnecessary.176 
One Bill of Rights draft authorised courts to grant remedies in situations where no 
adequate remedy presently existed.177  Despite this being absent from the final version 
courts have nonetheless developed remedies.178  In Simpson v Attorney-General McKay J 
questioned “how rights can be protected and promoted if they are merely affirmed but 
there is no remedy for their breach and no other legal consequence”.179  Courts’ 
willingness to develop remedies in this way indicates their desire to protect and promote 
rights.  Some gaps in the Bill of Rights have been interpreted as Parliament delegating 
authority to the judiciary to explore those areas themselves.180 
In summary the judiciary has indicated a willingness to develop the common law beyond 
what is specifically articulated in the Bill of Rights even in regard to rights that are framed 
negatively.181  This is dependent on the justiciability of the specific obligation and its 
extent is subject to some limitations.  Courts are concerned with protecting rights and will 
                                                 
172  Clark v Governor-General, above n 171, at [13]; Raniga, above n 171, at 28; see generally International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, above n 20, arts 2(3) and 7; and United Nations Convention 
Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 1465 UNTS 112 
(signed 10 December 1984, entered into force 26 June 1987), arts 10–13. 
173  Clark v Governor-General, above n 171, at [15]; and Raniga, above n 171, at 28. 
174  Clark v Governor-General, above n 171, at [57]; and Raniga, above n 171, at 30. 
175  Clark v Governor-General, above n 171, at [61] and [63]; and Raniga, above n 171, at 30. 
176  Clark v Governor-General, above n 171, at [76]; and Raniga, above n 171, at 30. 
177  Palmer, above n 93, at [6.25]; and Butler and Butler, above n 99, at [26.4.1]–[26.4.4]. 
178  Butler and Butler, above n 99, at [26.1.2], [26.6.1] and [26.7.2]–[26.7.7]. 
179  Simpson v Attorney-General [1994] 3 NZLR 667 (CA) [Baigent’s Case] at 717–718; see also Butler 
and Butler, above n 99, at [26.6.1]. 
180  Butler and Butler, above n 99 at [26.6.1]; see R v Butcher [1992] 2 NZLR 257 (CA) at 269 per Gault J; 
Baigent’s Case, above n 179, at 718 per McKay J; and R v Shaheed [2002] 2 NZLR 377 (CA) at 410 
per Blanchard J. 
181  Butler and Butler, above n 99, at [26.8.1]. 
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act accordingly.  The imposition of positive obligations is therefore an option well open to 
the courts. 
2 Human Rights Commission 
The HRC has indicated that positive obligations are required for thorough protection of all 
rights – especially horizontal rights such as slavery.182  The ICCPR’s general provision 
requires states to adopt legislation and all other necessary measures to give effect to 
rights.183  Failure to protect against rights abuse by private actors or to provide effective 
remedies violates the ICCPR.184  The duty to protect is not limited to the expressly positive 
articles.185  Positively framed rights merely generate stricter and narrower obligations than 
those that are negatively framed.186  For example states must protect against torture 
committed by private actors despite being a negatively framed right.187  The ICCPR 
slavery provisions are framed positively and are read by the HRC as requiring prohibition 
by law.188 
As with the ECHR, states are allocated a large discretion as to the measures required to 
meet those obligations.189  Article 2 suggests generally “judicial, administrative, educative 
or other appropriate measures”.190  Some rights are more specific – requiring prohibition 
                                                 
182  International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, above n 20, art 2; Nowak, above n 32, at 4; Office 
of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, above n 147, at 4; see generally Human 
Rights Committee General Comment 31: Nature of the General Legal Obligation on States Parties to 
the Covenant CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13 (2004); Human Rights Committee Concluding Observations, 
United States of America CCPR/C/USA/CO/3/Rev.1 (2006) at [10]; and Human Rights Committee 
AreNZ et al v Germany, CCPR/C/80/D/11138/2002 (2004) at [8.5]. 
183  International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, above n 20, art 2. 
184  Nowak, above n 32, at 35; Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, above n 
147, at 4; and Human Rights Committee AreNZ et al v Germany, above n 182, at [8.5]. 
185  Merrills, above n 153, at 94; Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 
above n 147, at [18] and [48]; Human Rights Committee General Comment 31, above n 182, at [6]; see 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, above n 20, art 6(1), 17(2), 20, 23, 24 and 26. 
186  Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, above n 147, at 5; see generally 
Mendelssohn v Attorney-General, above n 166, at [50]. 
187  Human Rights Committee General Comment 20, above n 142, at [2]. 
188  International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, above n 20, art 8; and Office of the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Human Rights, above n 147, at [13]. 
189  Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, above n 147, at [18], [48]. 
190  International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, above n 20, art 2; Human Rights Committee 
General Comment 31, above n 182, at [7]–[8]; and Office of the United Nations High Commissioner 
for Human Rights, above n 147, at 5. 
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by law.191  The nature of a right is the biggest determining factor in what protection 
measures are required.192  For instance, the ICCPR does not provide a right to criminal 
prosecution of perpetrators.  Nonetheless criminalisation is urged in cases of serious 
violations.193 
New Zealand courts have discussed the HRC comments in William Eduardo Delgado Paez 
v Columbia.194  The state argued that they were only obligated to protect the security of a 
person arrested by the state.195  The HRC disagreed, interpreting the state’s obligations 
widely.  Even when the state merely knew of the threat they were required to act.196  This 
illustrates the HRC’s stance on states’ duty to protect against private violations of rights.197  
States can have some level of culpability even when they did not perform the act in 
question. 
3 ECtHR jurisprudence 
The ECtHR has found a wide range of positive obligations beyond those expressly stated 
in the ECHR.198  A key case is X and Y v The Netherlands which concerned the right to 
respect for private and family life.199  The right’s objective is to prevent “arbitrary 
interference by the public authorities”.200  However the Court held that the state must also 
secure the right in the private sphere.201  How this is to be done depends on the aspect of 
private life in question.202  This case specifically required criminal law because it 
                                                 
191  International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, above n 20, art 2; Human Rights Committee 
General Comment 31, above n 182, at [7]–[8]; and Office of the United Nations High Commissioner 
for Human Rights, above n 147, at 5. 
192  Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, above n 147, at [48], [59] and 
[87]. 
193  Nowak, above n 32, at 66. 
194  Human Rights Committee William Eduardo Delgado Paez v Columbia, CCPR/C/39/D/195/1985 
(1990).  
195  At [5.5]. 
196  At [5.5]. 
197  Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, above n 147, at 17–18. 
198  Alastair Mowbray “The European Convention on Human Rights” in Mashood A Baderin and Manisuli 
Ssenyonjo (eds) International Human Rights Law: Six Decades after the UDHR and Beyond (Ashgate 
Publishing, Farnham (England), 2010) 271 at 276 and 286. 
199  X and Y v The Netherlands, above n 149, at [18]; and Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms, above n 19, art 8. 
200  X and Y v The Netherlands, above n 149, at [23]. 
201  At [23]; see also Airey v Ireland (1979) 2 EHRR 305 (ECHR). 
202  X and Y v The Netherlands, above n 149, at [24]. 
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concerned sexual assault.203  A v The United Kingdom concerned the right to not be 
subjected to torture.204  The failure to convict the stepfather violated the judiciary’s 
obligations to protect A.205  The obligation to protect applied despite the ill-treatment 
being a private act.206  Here, the effective deterrence standard required criminal 
provisions.207  The ECHR’s negatively framed slavery provision also imposes positive 
obligations.  CN v UK is an example of this as is Siliadin where an immigrant to France 
was held in debt bondage as a domestic servant.208  In both cases legislation criminalising 
conduct commonly occurring alongside servitude was insufficient – the specific act of 
servitude needed criminalising.209 
4 Other jurisdictions 
(a) United Kingdom 
CN v UK indicated that the United Kingdom’s protections regarding slavery were 
insufficient.  This section will look at how the United Kingdom has dealt generally with 
the concept of positive obligations. 
The Human Rights Act 1998 (UK), (HRA), incorporates the ECHR into domestic law.210  
It excludes both Houses of Parliament from the scope of public authority.211  Furthermore 
it explicitly states that a failure to introduce a proposal for legislation is not subject to the 
HRA.212  If legislation cannot be interpreted consistently with the ECHR then courts will 
declare it incompatible but must still give it full effect.213  There is reasonable consensus in 
the United Kingdom that the HRA applies to judicial decisions regarding private 
                                                 
203  At [27]. 
204  A v The United Kingdom (1999) 227 EHRR 611 (ECHR) at [19]; and Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, above n 19, art 3. 
205  Ian Leigh “The UK’s Human Rights Act 1998: An Early Assessment” in Grant Huscroft and Paul 
Rishworth (eds) Litigating Rights: Perspectives from Domestic and International Law (Hart Publishing, 
United States of America, 2002) 323 at 341; and A v The United Kingdom, above n 204, at [9]–[11] and 
[23]–[24]. 
206  Mowbray, The Development of Positive Obligations under the European Convention on Human rights 
by the European Court of Human Rights, above n 145, at 44. 
207  At 44. 
208  Siliadin v France, above n 24, at [9]–[18]. 
209  At [142] and [145]. 
210  Human Rights Act, above n 96. 
211  Section 6(1)(3) and 6(1)(6). 
212  Section 6(1)(3) and 6(1)(6). 
213  Augenstein, above n 140, at [10]; and Butler and Butler, above n 99, at [28.2.3]. 
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situations.214  The dissent arises as to whether courts are obligated to develop the common 
law in a way that implements ECHR rights.215  While there is some horizontal application 
of rights it is said that there is not full horizontality which would require courts to create 
rights and remedies by developing the common law.216 
In Douglas v Hello! Ltd the Court of Appeal moved towards protection of privacy 
although it was not made out in this case.217  The courts’ need to have particular regard for 
freedom of expression means it is relevant to private situations as a liberty though not an 
action itself.218  Courts have subsequently provided some protection for privacy through 
expanding breach of confidence.219  It is unclear whether this is an incremental 
development or the creation of an entirely new cause of action.220  However it does 
indicate a willingness to protect rights in the private sphere even when they are not directly 
protected in the human rights legislation. 
In Venables v News Groups Newspapers, the High Court granted a worldwide injunction 
to protect the identities of two murderers.221  This departed significantly from the 
traditional scope of similar injunctions.222  Butler-Sloss J said that judicial actions must be 
ECHR compliant.223  Therefore the Court was obligated to protect the murderers from 
threats to their lives and so ordered the concealment of their identity.224  This is an 
example of the judiciary taking action to protect rights in the private sphere where the 
existing legal protections are inadequate.   
(b) Canada 
Canada has been more reluctant to expand the scope of state responsibility.  In Dunmore v 
Ontario the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) held that the Government had to take 
                                                 
214  Hunt, above n 119, at 76. 
215  At 76. 
216  At 80; The six types are: direct statutory horizontality, public liability horizontality, intermediary 
horizontality, remedial horizontality, indirect horizontality and full or direct horizontality: Leigh, above 
n 205, at 337–339. 
217  Leigh, above n 205, at 342; and Douglas v Hello! Ltd [2001] 2 WLR 992 (CA). 
218  Leigh, above n 205, at 342; and Human Rights Act, above n 96, s 12(4). 
219  Leigh, above n 205, at 337–339. 
220  See generally Hunt, above n 119, at 81. 
221  At 82; Leigh, above n 205, at 340; and Venables v News Group Newspapers [2001] EWHC QB 32. 
222  Leigh, above n 205, at 340. 
223  At 340. 
224  At 340. 
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positive action to guarantee freedom of association.225  The legislature had protected that 
right for all other workers except farm workers.226  The SCC said that “without the 
coercion of legislation” private employers would almost certainly breach the right.227  The 
state’s inaction was sufficiently linked to the violation of the right so it was obligated to 
improve the legislation.228  However the SCC said that there was no general “constitutional 
right to protective legislation per se”; it was limited to that particular context.229  A more 
recent decision, Gosselin v Quebec concerned the provision of welfare to citizens.230  The 
SCC decided that the right to security did not obligate the state to provide its citizens with 
welfare.231  They did not rule it out as a possible future development but said the facts of 
this case were an inappropriate basis.232 
(c) Germany 
In Germany, the Basic Law’s values guide the three branches of government’s use of all 
areas of law, including private law.233  This is primarily a result of the Lüth case which 
concerned a violation of freedom of speech by a private individual.234  Judges are bound to 
adhere to the basic rights when applying private law.235  Furthermore some basic rights can 
only be protected through state action which the state is thus obligated to take.236  For 
example the state is obligated to provide citizens with social welfare.237  In contrast to the 
Canadian position the Federal Constitutional Court read in positive social rights through 
the right to human dignity and the principle of the social state.238  This sort of wide 
interpretation of rights could be used as a model for developing protections of slavery. 
                                                 
225  Dunmore v Ontario (Attorney-General) (2001) 207 DLR (4th) 193 (SCC) at 1017. 
226  Paul Rishworth and others The NZ Bill of Rights (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2003) at 59. 
227  At 59. 
228  At 59. 
229  Dunmore v Ontario, above n 225, at 1017. 
230  Gosselin v Quebec (Attorney-General) [2002] 4 SCR 429.  
231  Schwebel, above n 115, at 1909; and Gosselin v Quebec, above n 230, at [81]. 
232  Schwebel, above n 115, at 1910; and Gosselin v Quebec, above n 230, at [83]. 
233  Donald P Kommers The Constitutional  Jurisprudence of the Federal Republic of Germany (Duke 
University Press, United States of America, 1989) at 376; Sabine Michalowski and Lorna Woods 
German Constitutional Law: The protection of civil liberties (Dartmouth Publishing Company, United 
Kingdom, 1999) at 73–74; and German Basic Law (Grundgesetz) (1949). 
234  Schwebel, above n 115, at 1925; and BVerfGE, 7, 198 I. Senate (1 BvR 400/51) Lüth, above n 115. 
235  Michalowski and Woods, above n 233, at 74. 
236  At 77. 
237  Schwebel, above n 115, at 1902. 
238  At 1902; and German Basic Law, above n 233, art 1(1). 
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(d) India  
The Constitution of India contains both fundamental rights and directive principles of state 
policy.  The fundamental rights are mostly negative rights and are enforceable.239  The 
directive principles are unenforceable and primarily concern social and economic rights.240  
However the fundamental rights mean very little if the socioeconomic environment of 
India remains unchanged.241  Using the directive principles to interpret the fundamental 
rights widely has resulted in positive obligations upon the state.242  For instance the right to 
life has been combined with the principle of improving public health to obligate the state 
to provide medical facilities.243 
5 Further arguments 
The Bill of Rights was specifically drafted to apply only to state and public functions.244  It 
may therefore be contrary to Parliament’s original intentions to read in positive 
obligations.245  In fact the White Paper explicitly stated that the Bill of Rights does not 
impose positive obligations on the state.246  Furthermore the implementation of the ICCPR 
in New Zealand is not exclusively dependent upon the Bill of Rights.247  Thus the 
                                                 
239  N.R. Madhava Menon “Constitutional Governance and Economic-Social Rights” in KP Saksena (ed) 
Human Rights and the Constitution: Vision and the Reality (Gyan Publishing House, New Delhi, 2003) 
97 at 103; see KP Saksena “Introduction” in KP Saksena (ed) Human Rights and the Constitution: 
Vision and the Reality (Gyan Publishing House, New Delhi, 2003) 11 at 15–16; and Constitution of 
India 1950. 
240  Saksena, above n 239, at 15–16; and Sujata V. Manohar “Human Rights and the Constitution: An 
Overview” in KP Saksena (ed) Human Rights and the Constitution: Vision and the Reality (Gyan 
Publishing House, New Delhi, 2003) 28 at 30. 
241  At 16. 
242  Menon, above n 239, at 104. 
243  Mool Chand Sharma “Human Rights and Judicial Activism: Challenges and Opportunities” in KP 
Saksena (ed) Human Rights and the Constitution: Vision and the Reality (Gyan Publishing House, New 
Delhi, 2003) 79 at 89; Anand Grover, Maitreyi Misra and Lubhyathi Rangarajan “Right to Health: 
Addressing Inequities through Litigation in India” in Colleen M Flood and Aeyal Gross (eds) The Right 
to Health at the Public/Private Divide: A Global Comparative Study (Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge (United Kingdom), 2014) 423 at 437; see also Passchim Banga Khet Mazdoor Samiti v 
State of West Bengal (1996) 4 SCC 37 (India). 
244  New Zealand Bill of Rights Act, above n 98, s 3; Butler and Butler, above n 99, at [5.2.11]; (14 August 
1990) 510 NZPD 3451; see also Leigh, above n 205, at 337. 
245  (10 October 1989) 502 NZPD 13040; and (14 August 1990) 507 NZPD 3450. 
246  Palmer, above n 93, at [10.179]. 
247  See Rishworth and others, above n 226, at 61–62. 
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existence of positive obligations under ICCPR does not necessarily imply the same under 
the Bill of Rights.248 
There are several practical difficulties with finding positive obligations under the Bill of 
Rights.  Firstly, our legal system has multiple sources of law.  Determining whether the 
omission to protect a right is a legislative oversight or a gap in the common law can make 
it difficult to attribute responsibility.249  Secondly, it is unclear whether omissions to 
regulate can fall within s 3.250  Omissions can constitute acts done but the omission to 
regulate is of a different nature being so closely tied to governmental policies.251  The Bill 
of Rights must be enforceable by the courts.252  This becomes difficult if courts are 
required to pass judgment on government policy decisions.253  That would be contrary to 
the separation of powers. 
Thirdly, bringing human rights rules into areas of private law will introduce greater 
uncertainty and undermine the autonomy of parties.254  The lack of clear-cut and certain 
definitions in ss 98 and 98AA is emblematic of the difficulty of transplanting human rights 
law into domestic criminal law.255  Human rights law applies to the state, aims at 
protecting society and developing systems and therefore uses expansive interpretations.256  
Criminal law focuses on individual culpability which requires precise definitions to 
provide certainty and predictability.257  Fourthly, positive obligations involve an even 
greater shift of power from Parliament to the judiciary.  This was always a concern 
regarding the Bill of Rights, even without positive obligations.258  With positive 
obligations the judiciary would be far more active in remedying legislative omissions and 
generally making law. 
                                                 
248  At 61–62. 
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However this recent trend of positive obligations is necessary.  International expectation is 
that the protection of human rights is prioritised.259  Privatisation has seen many traditional 
state functions delegated to private actors.260  There are also a number of human rights, 
such as slavery, which are primarily violated by private parties, not states.261  Most 
societies are increasingly state-regulated such that most private interactions have some 
public aspect.262 
The long title of the Bill of Rights is similar to the general provisions of the ICCPR and 
ECHR.  Interpreting it in light of those treaties thus suggests that it too gives rise to 
positive obligations.263  Arguably incorporating rights into a single, constitutional 
instrument sufficiently promotes human rights principles without requiring further 
obligations.264  However increasingly it has been realised that merely preventing state 
violations does not adequately protect rights.  Individuals are very capable of violating 
human rights. Effective human rights protection therefore involves the regulation and 
education of individuals.265  Jeremy Waldron has explained this as there being waves of 
duties on the state.266  The first wave is to not enslave people but the second wave is to 
educate about what constitutes slavery whilst another wave is to remedy situations where 
slavery is likely to occur.267 
Furthermore, many of the traditional dividing lines applied to human rights now primarily 
create shields behind which human rights violations more easily occur.  The distinction 
between active and permissive legislation is one such distinction.268  Another is the use of 
a public/private divide.269  The threshold for what constitutes public behaviour varies 
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between states.270  Therefore using that distinction to determine what constitutes a human 
rights violation may result in overly strict protection in some states and lacunae in 
others.271  In addition rhetoric about positive and negative rights is increasingly being 
replaced with the idea that all rights have a positive element.272 
6 In Summary 
Reading in positive obligations is a key part of modern human rights jurisprudence around 
the world and is accepted by academic commentary.  The HRC’s conclusive statements 
about positive obligations and the open door left by domestic courts suggest that the Bill of 
Rights should be read as imposing positive obligations on the state to actively protect 
human rights.  Whilst there are certainly cogent practical reasons against that, the 
importance of protecting human rights in today’s world outweighs them.  New Zealand is 
hence positively obligated to protect against slavery. 
IX A Tort Action 
As discussed in Part VII, one response of the courts implicated by Drittwirkung to the 
inadequate legal protection of slavery victims is the development of a tort specifically 
addressing slavery.  The need to fill the gap is further supported by the existence of 
positive obligations.  A claim in tort is advantageous for the compensation, vindication and 
deterrence it offers.273  The privacy tort was recently created by reading privacy into the 
Bill of Rights.  It is useful in consideration of  a tort for slavery to look at the creation of 
this privacy tort. 
Despite the exclusion of privacy from the Bill of Rights and the previous absence of a tort 
it was an important common law value.274  Hence the authoritative declaration of a privacy 
of information tort in Hosking was preceded by years of contemplation.275  Parliament had 
already provided a number of protections for privacy and some argued that the courts 
should not extend the law further.276  However Tipping J responded that:277 
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273  Stewart, above n 22, at 907. 
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If Parliament wishes a particular field to be covered entirely by an enactment, 
and to otherwise be a no-go area for the Courts, it would need to make the 
restriction clear. 
Furthermore Gault P and Blanchard J considered the development of a privacy tort 
consistent with, not precluded by the statutory developments.278  Any common law 
development regarding slavery would need to be consistent with existing statutory 
measures.  In 2012 the High Court also introduced a privacy tort of intrusion upon 
seclusion.279  These privacy torts are still relatively new and very uncertain.  Nonetheless 
they exemplify the courts’ willingness to develop the common law in response to the 
increasing importance of privacy both domestically and internationally. 
Reading in rights requires some level of judicial activism.  However a number of the key 
arguments against the privacy tort do not apply to slavery.  In that respect there is a 
stronger argument for a slavery tort than there was for a privacy tort.  Privacy is a 
relatively wide and uncertain legal concept.280  It has only recently developed due to 
greater concern with rights, increased prominence of the value of individuals and modern 
accessibility of information.281  Comparatively, slavery is a narrower, older and more 
certain concept than privacy with more universal condemnation.  Privacy is absent from 
the Bill of Rights and its existence significantly restricts the right to freedom of 
expression.282  Slavery is likewise absent.  However protection against slavery does not 
involve direct balancing against any other rights. 
In the United Kingdom breach of confidence was expanded to include privacy. In contrast 
to this New Zealand privacy is a newly created, separate tort.  It does however bear 
resemblance to breach of confidence.283  The courts’ experience in dealing with this 
similar concept and the extensive prior contemplation of a privacy tort perhaps made its 
introduction an easier step.  It is a fine line whether this was a development of the common 
law consistent with the Drittwirkung concept or the introduction of a completely new tort 
to satisfy positive obligations.284  However the New Zealand courts preferred to treat 
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privacy separately from breach of confidence because they considered them two distinct 
concepts.285  This reasoning could be similarly used to support treating slavery separately 
from the torts mentioned in Part IV. 
The development of a tort of slavery would significantly improve the protection offered 
against slavery in New Zealand.  The Courts would be able to incorporate into it the idea 
of ownership and use the International Labour Organization indicators to effectively 
identify slavery situations.286  Given the positive obligations to protect against slavery this 
is an improvement that ought to be made. 
X Conclusion 
New Zealand has some legal measures in place to prevent and prosecute slavery.  
Unfortunately these measures do not address the issue at the heart of slavery, ownership of 
another human being.  The Bill of Rights can be used to read these provisions widely but 
even this is not enough to provide comprehensive protection.   
Fortunately the traditional focus of human rights on preventing state action is being 
supplemented with the idea of Drittwirkung and positive obligations.  States must actively 
ensure thorough protection against rights violations including those committed by private 
individuals.  In CN v UK the ECtHR imposed these obligations upon the United Kingdom.  
The narrow framing of the existing legislation had left the applicant, a victim of domestic 
servitude, without remedy.  Despite the ECHR slavery provision being negatively framed 
the United Kingdom was obligated to take positive action to prevent and prosecute slavery. 
New Zealand needs to recognise slavery as a high-priority issue.  Specific attention needs 
to be directed towards improving the protection offered so that there is no gap through 
which slavery can escape without consequences.  The development of a tort action dealing 
with slavery is something that should be considered by the courts.  This would provide an 
action especially designed to combat slavery.  The application of Drittwirkung and New 
Zealand’s positive obligations necessitate nothing less.  William Wilberforce’s statement 
ought to be heeded; New Zealand must not look the other way.287  
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